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Abstract
This paper examines the e¤ects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies.
It extends existing models of asymmetric duopoly and symmetric oligopoly where consumer
expectations about market shares are passive. First, demand and product di¤erentiation
parameters are calibrated using detailed data from the Spanish market from 2010. Next,
equilibrium outcomes and welfare e¤ects under alternative scenarios of future termination
rates are predicted. Lowering termination rates typically lowers prots of all networks and
improves consumer and total surplus.
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1 Introduction
Regulators around the world, and especially in the European Union, have been and still are
concerned about too high mobile termination rates (MTR) and intervene in the markets of
termination. The reason is that high termination rates are thought to lead to ine¢ ciently
high retail prices. The intervention of European and national regulators has lead to a re-
duction of the average MTR in the EU from e0:1265 to e0:0855 between October 2005
and October 2008.1 At present, the European Commission recommends national regulatory
authorities (NRAs) to push termination rates further down to the cost of terminating a call
(estimated to be between 1 and 2 euro cents) by the end of 2012 (EC, 2009). Network oper-
ators, on the other hand, have been and keep opposing cuts in termination rates. They often
argue that lowering MTRs will lead to the reduction of handset subsidies and that in the end,
consumers are hurt by this. This is sometimes referred to as a waterbed e¤ect. Although
the existence of a waterbed e¤ect is usually acknowledged by regulators, the strength of this
e¤ect is heavily disputed.
The burden of MTR regulation is quite high and time consuming. Each NRA needs
to start a round of public consultations with stakeholders every time it wants to propose
a reduction in MTR. This involves several rounds of discussions and debates, backed up
by consultants and studies. One may ask oneself whether all this e¤ort is worth spending.
Namely, the mainstream theoretical models (La¤ont, Rey, & Tirole, 1998b; Gans & King,
2001) predict that lowering MTR towards cost indeed improves total welfare but does so by
increasing industry prot at the expense of consumer surplus. This is somewhat puzzling
given the opposition by the industry and the intentions of NRAs (who are supposed to protect
consumers) to reduce MTRs. It is also inconsistent with the empirical ndings of Growitsch,
Marcus, and Wernick (2010) who analyzed the e¤ect of a reduction in MTR between 2005
and 2008 on retail price and demand. Hurkens and López (2010) recently established a new
theoretical result, that in fact predicts the opposite: consumers benet and industry loses
from reductions in MTR. This new theory emphasizes the role of network externalities, and
in particular, the role of consumer expectations. The puzzle is resolved when consumers
expectations are assumed passive but required to be fullled in equilibrium (as dened by
Katz and Shapiro (1985)), instead of being rationally responsive to non-equilibrium prices,
as assumed in earlier works. It is worth mentioning that a few recent papers also attempt
to reconcile the mentioned puzzle (Armstrong & Wright, 2009; Hoernig, Inderst, & Valletti,
2011; Jullien, Rey, & Sand-Zantman, 2010)2.
1See Growitsch et al. (2010).
2These three papers have in common that they introduce additional realistic features of the telecommu-
nication industry into the La¤ont et al. (1998a,b) framework and then show that for some parameter range
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This article intends to quantify and predict the consumer gains and industry losses of
future MTR regulation in Spain by calibrating the Hurkens and López (2010) model. In order
to do so this paper employs a rich data set of the Spanish market, made publicly available
by CMT, the Spanish NRA. This data set contains not only information about number of
subscribers, minutes of tra¢ c, and revenues, but also distinguishes between pre-pay and
post-pay clients, and on-net and o¤-net tra¢ c. Moreover, it contains data about revenues
obtained from termination and those obtained from xed monthly subscription fees. This is
important since theoretical predictions depend crucially on the type of competition (linear
or non-linear tari¤s) and on whether termination-based price discrimination is allowed for or
not. The data reveal that only post-pay clients pay monthly xed fees and that there exist
(on average) signicant on-net/o¤-net price di¤erentials. Since post-pay clients make much
more calls and generate much more revenues than pre-pay clients, the focus in this article
will be on this segment of the market. The model will therefore allow for rms to compete
in non-linear tari¤s with possibly distinct prices for on- and o¤-net calls.
Before starting with the calibration it is necessary to extend the theoretical model in order
to allow for (i) more than two rms, (ii) asymmetries (in market shares and in termination
rates), and (iii) call externality. In fact, the theoretical model has been extended and shown
to be robust to all three extensions in isolation. However, in order to calibrate the Spanish
market it is necessary to extend the model in all three directions simultaneously. Since it is
very hard to obtain analytical results for this triple extension, one has to resort to numerical
methods. The rst two extensions are necessary since in Spain there are four major rms
with very asymmetric market shares. Moreover, not all networks have been subject to
the same MTR. The extension to call externalities is important as it has been argued by
Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) and Harbord and Hoernig (2010) that if the call externality
is very strong, so that people enjoy receiving calls as much as placing calls (or even more,
since receiving calls is usually free of charge in Europe) reducing MTRs may be benecial
both to rms and to consumers, despite the reduction in handset subsidies, simply because
consumers will receive much more calls when MTRs and, as a consequence, retail prices are
reduced. In particular, Harbord and Hoernig (2010) calibrate an extension of the La¤ont et
al. (1998b) model, so as to allow for asymmetric oligopoly and call externality. They nd
that as MTR is reduced to cost, rmsprots increase for any level of the call externality
parameter, whereas total welfare and consumer surplus are decreased for low values of the
call externality. In particular, they predict that consumer surplus increases only if the call
joint prots are maximized at termination charges above cost. Moreover, these papers conclude that the
need to regulate termination charges is reduced since the socially optimal termination charge would also be
above cost. In contrast, Hurkens and López (2010) nd that total welfare is maximized with termination
charges at or below cost.
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externality parameter exceeds 0:5.
The present paper calibrates the call externality parameter, employing data from the
Spanish market, to be very mild, about 0:07. Nevertheless, the simulation results show that
lowering termination rates toward cost (from about 5 to 2.45 euro cents) is good for consumer
surplus and total welfare but hurts all rms. While the percentage increase in total welfare
is mild (+0:9%), total prot is seriously a¤ected ( 17%); the improvement in consumer
surplus is moderate (+4:1%). In absolute terms, however, consumer surplus increases by
about 580 million euros per year. The bill and keep regime yields an even better outcome
in terms of consumer surplus.
The simulations conrm that there exists a partial waterbed e¤ect on the xed component
of the three-part tari¤.3 While the (average) xed fee increases as the termination charge
decreases, rms cannot increase it too much so that customers do benet from lower MTR.
The partial waterbed e¤ect also explains why prot is reduced when termination charge is
lowered. According to Hurkens and López (2010), the partial waterbed e¤ect result is due
to the assumption of passive consumer expectations. Nonetheless, one can observe in the
simulated asymmetric oligopoly model that lowering MTR does not always lead to increases
in the xed fee of every rm. In particular, the largest rm may reduce its xed fee when
the call externality is strong. On the other hand, above cost termination charges may induce
the smallest operator to o¤er negative xed fees (i.e., subsidies); still it makes positive prot
because of termination revenues.
Finally, the paper explores the impact of asymmetric termination rates on competition
and welfare. Two forms of asymmetric MTR regulation are considered. First, only the
smallest rm (i.e. Yoigo) is allowed to charge an access markup, whereas the rest of rms
are subject to cost-based regulation. The result is that Yoigo gains and other rms lose. Al-
though granting an access markup to the smallest operator slightly raises consumer surplus,
it does reduce total welfare. This result is analogous to that of Peitz (2005) for two rms and
no call externality. Second, when both Orange (which is the third operator in the market)
and Yoigo are granted an access markup, both rms benet. In addition, Orange increases
its market share at the expense of the two larger operators (i.e. Movistar and Vodafone). In
this case consumer surplus is reduced in comparison with the situation where all rms are
subject to cost-based regulation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 calibrates
the model with Spanish market data reported by CMT. Section 4 reports the simulation
results and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains some robustness checks.
3This is consistent with Genakos and Valetti (2011) who empirically nd that the waterbed e¤ect is not
full.
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2 The model
To estimate the impact on total welfare, consumer surplus and producer surplus of regula-
tion in the Spanish market one needs to consider a model of competition between multiple
networks with asymmetric market shares. In addition, the model must allow for price dis-
crimination between on-net and o¤-net calls and consider call externalities.
As commented above, Hurkens and López (2010) analyzed competition between (i) an
arbitrary number of networks, (ii) asymmetries, and (iii) call externality. However, each case
was examined in isolation. In order to calibrate the model for the Spanish market, one needs
to extend the theoretical model in all three directions simultaneously. The general model
will be constructed as follows: (i) to consider an arbitrary number of networks and imperfect
competition the Logit model will be used, (ii) to introduce asymmetries in market shares this
paper follows Carter and Wright (1999, 2003) by allowing for a brand loyalty parameter, (iii)
nally, call externalities will be introduced by assuming that receivers obtain utility from
receiving a call, as in Jeon, La¤ont, and Tirole (2004), Berger (2004, 2005), Cambini and
Valletti (2008), and López (2011).
The standard assumption of rationally responsive expectations will be relaxed and re-
placed by one of fullled equilibrium expectations (as in Hurkens & López, 2010): First
consumers form expectations about network sizes, then rms set prices, and nally con-
sumers make optimal subscription or purchasing decisions, given the expectations and the
prices.4 In equilibrium, realized and expected network sizes coincide. It is known that un-
der rationally responsive expectations, reducing mobile termination rates to cost raises total
surplus, but may decrease consumer surplus. In particular, consumer surplus increases when
termination rates are lowered only if the call externality is very strong. However, under (pas-
sive) self-fullling expectations, decreasing termination rates raises consumer surplus even if
the call externality is low or even absent.
The model in this paper is a generalization of the network competition model with (pas-
sive) self-fullling expectations. It considers competition between n  2 full-coverage net-
works. Each has the same cost structure. The marginal cost of a call equals c = cO + cT ,
where cO and cT denote the costs borne by the originating and terminating network, respec-
tively. To terminate an o¤-net call, the originating network j 6= i must pay a non-negative
access charge ai to the terminating network i. The termination mark-up from terminating
a call in network i is equal to
4Instead, under rationally responsive expectations the literature assumes that rst rms o¤er prices, then
consumers form expectations about network sizes and make optimal subscription decisions, given the prices
and their expectations. This means that for all prices (even for those out of the equilibrium) expectations
are required to be self-fullling.
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mi  ai   cT .
Networks (i.e., rms) o¤er di¤erentiated but substitutable services. Firms compete for
a continuum of consumers of mass M . Each rm i (i = 1; :::; n) charges a xed fee Fi and
may discriminate between on-net and o¤-net calls. Firm is marginal on-net price is written
pii and o¤-net price for a call from network i to network j is written pij. Consumers utility
from making calls of length q is given by a concave, increasing and bounded utility function
u(q), whereas consumers utility from receiving a call of that length is u(q). It is assumed
that u = u. Call demand q(p) is dened by u0(q(p)) = p. The indirect utility derived from
making calls at price p is v(p) = u(q(p))   pq(p). For given prices pii and pij, the prot
earned on the on-net calls is
R(pii) = (pii   c)q(pi),
whereas the prot earned on the o¤-net calls to network j is
R^j(pij) = (pij   c mj)q(pij).
In order to calibrate the model the call demand function is assumed to be linear. Thus, R(p)
has a unique maximum at p = pM , is increasing when p < pM , and decreasing when p > pM ,
where pM denotes the monopoly price.
As is standard in the literature, the calling pattern is assumed to be balanced, which
means that the percentage of calls originating on a given network and completed on another
given (including the same) network is equal to the fraction of consumers subscribing to the
terminating network. Let i denote the market share of network i. The prot of network i
is therefore equal to:
i  iM

iR(pii) +
X
j 6=i
jR^j(pij) +
X
j 6=i
jmiq(pji) + Fi   f

. (1)
Market share. The n rms have complete coverage and compete for a continuum of con-
sumers of massM . Market shares are derived using a Logit model. Given some expectations
i and prices, a customer subscribed to rm i obtains the following utility
wi = i + i[v(pii) + u(q(pii))] +
X
j 6=i
j [v(pij) + u(q(pji))]  Fi,
where i  0 is the brand loyalty parameter for network i.
Dene Ui = wi + "i, for i = 1; :::; n. The noise terms "i are random variables of zero
mean and unit variance, identically and independently double exponentially distributed.
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They reect consumerspreference for one good over another. The parameter  > 0 reects
the degree of product di¤erentiation in a Logit model. A high value of  implies that most of
the value is determined by the random draw so that competition between the rms is rather
weak. A consumer will subscribe to network i if and only if Ui > Uj for j 6= i = 1; :::; n. The
probability of subscribing to network i is denoted by i where
i =
exp[wi=]Pn
k=1 exp[wk=]
. (2)
Note that
@i
@Fi
=  i(1  i)

, (3)
while for j 6= i
@j
@Fi
=
ij

. (4)
Consumer surplus. Consumer surplus in the Logit model has been derived by Small and
Rosen (1981) and for a mass M = 1 is given by (up to a constant)
CS =  ln
 
nX
k=1
exp[wk=]
!
: (5)
Timing. The terms of interconnection are regulated. Given access charges fa1; :::; ang (or
equivalently, given termination mark-ups fm1; :::;mng) the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Consumers form expectations i about the number of subscribers of each network i
with i  0, and
P
i i = 1 (i.e. full participation is assumed).
2. Firms take these expectations as given and choose simultaneously retail tari¤s Ti =
(Fi; fpijgnj=1).
3. Consumers make rational subscription and consumption decisions, given their expec-
tations and given the networkstari¤s.
Therefore, market share i is a function of prices and consumer expectations. Self-
fullling expectations imply that at equilibrium i = i.
Call prices. It is straightforward to show that the optimal on-net price equals
pii =
c
1 + 
: (6)
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This price maximizes the total surplus from on-net calls. Note that this price is equal to
cost when there is no call externality (that is, when  = 0) but is strictly below cost when
call externalities exist. In this way the network perfectly internalizes the externality.
In order to obtain the formula for o¤-net prices, one needs to resort to the usual perceived
marginal cost principle: a rm can o¤er its subscribers the same surplus more e¢ ciently by
setting pij closer to cost while adjusting the xed fee Fi accordingly. When there is no call
externality this yields pij = c+mj. However, when there exist call externalities one needs to
be careful in an oligopoly with at least three rms. For example, lowering pij will improve
the welfare of consumers on networks i and j, but not on other networks k. Raising Fi so
as to maintain the number of subscribers of network i constant is possible. However, the
relative market shares of networks j and k would change. In this example, j=k would
increase. It would thus not be correct to assume that all market shares remain constant. To
circumvent this problem, assume that each network i charges a uniform o¤-net price p^i for
calls to all networks j 6= i. In this case, a change in p^i a¤ects all subscribers from networks
j 6= i equally and thus keeps their relative market shares constant. Adjusting Fi to keep i
constant now implies that in fact all market shares are kept constant. It is straightforward
to show that the optimal o¤-net price equals
p^i =
P
j 6=i j(c+mj)
1  (1 + )i : (7)
Note that this o¤-net price increases in the call externality parameter. The higher the benet
of receiving calls, the higher will be the optimal o¤-net price in order to reduce the relative
attractiveness of rival networks.
Fixed fees. The xed fees are obtained by keeping call prices constant in the prot func-
tion and computing the rst-order conditions using equations (3) and (4). After substituting
the call prices found in equations (6) and (7) this yields
Fi = f +

1  i   2iR(pii) +
2i
1  i
X
j 6=i
jR^j(p^i) +
2i
1  i
X
j 6=i
jmiq(p^j): (8)
Equilibrium. The equilibrium prices are given in terms of market shares, which are en-
dogenous. In order to solve for the equilibrium market shares one needs to combine equations
(6), (7), (8) and (2). Analytically this is hard, if not impossible, to do but numerically there
is no problem, as long as one knows the termination charges, call demand, the strength of
the call externality and the cost, product di¤erentiation and brand loyalty parameters. Most
of these parameters will be calibrated using publicly available data from CMT, the Spanish
national regulatory authority. For these calibrations the data from the last quarter of 2010
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reported in CMT (2010) will be used.
3 Calibration of parameters
The Spanish market has four major networks, plus several small virtual network operators.
Attention is restricted to the four major networks, Movistar, Vodafone, Orange and Yoigo.5
Since the model assumes rms compete in non-linear tari¤s, only the data pertaining to
post-pay customers is used. Table 1 reports the number of lines and relative market shares.
Table1. Subscribers and market shares in 2010Q4
Network Post-Pay Lines Market Share (%)
(1) Movistar 13723681 44:7
(2) Vodafone 9418402 31:7
(3) Orange 6454558 21:0
(4) Yoigo 1119354 3:6
Total 30715995 100:0
The costs of origination and termination of a call is estimated at e0.0245/minute.6 Since
no data is available on the xed cost per subscriber it is simply assumed that f = 0. This
does not inuence directly the loss in industry prot or the gain in consumer surplus as a
result of lowering termination rates. However, it does indirectly inuence the results since
the product di¤erentiation parameter  will be calibrated from the observed and predicted
average xed fees. However, the results appear to be very robust to changes in  so that
this assumption is not expected to a¤ect the results signicantly.
The call demand function is calibrated by imposing linearity, assuming that price elas-
ticity equals  0:57 and by observing from the CMT data that average call price for post-pay
5The rest are MVNOs, which accounted for about 2.3% of post-pay mobile subscriptions in the last
quarter of 2010 (Table 67, CMT, 2010).
6This estimate is provided by the Spanish regulator (CMT, 2009) in the Resolution approving the es-
tablishment of a glide-path from October 2009 until April 2012. Also, the French regulator estimates that
the long-run incremental cost on mobile networks lies between 1 and 2 euro-cents (ARCEP, 2008). Harbord
and Hoernig (2010) assume a long-run marginal or incremental cost of originating and terminating calls on
mobile networks of 1ppm. Table A.1 in the Appendix reports some robustness checks for termination cost
parameters equal to 1 and 3 euro cents.
7This value is also assumed by Harbord and Hoernig (2010). They argue that an elasticity of demand
for mobile-originated calls of  0:5 is consistent with the recent literature. Dewenter and Haucap (2008)
reported short-run demand elasticities of between  0:26 and  0:40. The UK Competition Commission
(2003) received estimates varying between  0:48 and  0:80. Finally, Ofcom (2007) states that a reasonable
range for the elasticity is between  0:2 and  0:4. Table A.2 in the Appendix reports some robustness checks
for the cases of an elasticity equal to  0:3 and  0:7.
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clients is equal to p = 0:108462 (found by dividing total revenue from call minutes by the
number of minutes) while the average number of minutes per subscriber equals q = 436:6.8
Solving q(p) = q and  0:5 =  bp=q(p) yields the call demand function q(p) = a  bp where
a = 654:9 and b = 2012:7:
Note that this call demand function should be interpreted as the total number of minutes
called by a single subscriber, assuming that each subscriber calls a mass 1 of other subscribers,
each with equal probability. Of course, in reality people make more calls of shorter duration,
but that does not inuence the analysis. The approach in this respect follows closely de Bijl
and Peitz (2000, 2004).
It is assumed that in the last quarter of 2010 networks played the equilibrium, given
the existing termination rates. These termination rates were equal to e0:049505/minute for
the three largest rms and e0:067361/minute for the smallest operator Yoigo (CMT, 2009).
Denote this combination of termination charges by a2010. This means that the observed
market shares for 2010Q4 in Table 1 are in fact the equilibrium market shares. One can
now obtain the on-net and o¤-net call prices (as a function of the unknown call externality
parameter ) from equations (6) and (7). Similarly, one can nd the equilibrium xed fees
from equation (8). These will depend on  and . In order to calibrate  one can use the
observation from the data about average xed fees among post-pay subscribers. This average
xed fee in 2010Q4 was 11:61 euros (per quarter).9 One can thus calibrate  from solvingX
k
kFk = 11:61:
This yields  as a function of .10
Finally, substituting the calibrated  and using the prices obtained, the formulas for
market shares in the Logit model will yield the brand loyalty parameters (all as functions of
). To be precise, it will yield the di¤erence in brand loyalty parameters 1   2, 2   3,
and 3   4. Since only the di¤erences matter, it is assumed without loss of generality that
4 = 0.
The call externality parameter  can be calibrated by observing that the di¤erence be-
tween average o¤-net price and on-net price equals 0:0322.11 The theoretical di¤erence
between average o¤-net and on-net prices is increasing in . For  = 0 this di¤erence equals
8See Tables 48 and 56 in CMT (2010).
9See Table 58 in CMT (2010).
10In the simulations  decreases with : from 10:27 for  = 0 to 6:67 for  = 0:8.
11This can be deduced from the numbers for on- and o¤-net calls in Tables 48 and 56 of CMT (2010).
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approximately 0:026. This is obtained from the formulas for on- and o¤-net prices (6) and
(7), and from the observation that average o¤-net price equalsP
k k(1  k)q(p^k)p^kP
k k(1  k)q(p^k)
:
One can calibrate  by solving for the value that matches theoretical and observed di¤erence
between average o¤-net and on-net prices. This yields  = 0:0727. It suggests the call
externality is very mild. On the other hand, in reality not all post-pay contracts involve
termination-based price discrimination. Some contracts will specify uniform call prices. This
obviously reduces the observed on-net/o¤-net price di¤erential. The true call externality
may thus be stronger than . Since no data is available on the proportion of contracts with
termination-based price discrimination, it is not possible to get a more precise calibration
result. Still, if the call externality were very strong, rms would have incentives to create a
large di¤erence between prices for o¤-net and on-net calls and would not be very tempted
to o¤er contracts with uniform prices. One may expect that rms only o¤er uniform calls
prices if the gain from optimal termination-based price discrimination is small compared to
the attractiveness of o¤ering a simple uniform tari¤. This then would again suggest that call
externalities are not extremely strong. Also note that for  > 0:95 the largest rm would, in
theory, set the o¤-net price so high as to choke-o¤ o¤-net calls altogether.12 In most of the
reported simulation results,  2 [0; 0:8] but values between 0:1 and 0:3 seem more plausible.
4 Simulation results
In this section, rst the implications of various future schemes for termination rates are
explored. Second, the issue of asymmetric termination rates is addressed. The calibrated
model is used to simulate how prices, consumer surplus, prots and welfare change under
di¤erent MTR regimes. The rst regime considered is the one that will be in place at 2012Q1
according to the glide-path announced by CMT. These termination rates are
a2012 = (0:04; 0:04; 0:04; 0:049764):
That is, e0:04/minute for Movistar, Vodafone and Orange, and e0:049764/minute for Yoigo.
The second regime considered is where all termination rates are set equal to the cost of ter-
mination, that is, ai = ac b  0:0245. Finally, the hypothetical regime of bill and keep with
ai = a
b&k  0 is considered. The bill and keep regime is special since below cost termination
12Because q(p) = 0 for p > 0:325.
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charges may lead some rms to set o¤-net price below on-net price, especially when the
call externality is relatively weak. Since such pricing strategies are hard to implement, it
is imposed that o¤-net prices cannot be below on-net price. This implies that when rms
would want to do this, they in fact must charge a uniform price for on- and o¤-net calls.
This price would then be equal to perceived marginal cost, so that rm i would charge
pii = p^i = ic+ (1  i)cO.
4.1 Alternative scenarios of future termination rates
First, the simulation results for prices, market shares and individual prots are reported.
Next, the implications of these results on total consumer surplus, total prot and total
welfare are discussed.
Figure 1: Equilibrium o¤-net prices under di¤erent MTR regimes [a2010 (-), a2012 (- -), ac b
(.-), ab&k (.)] and on-net price (x).
Prices. Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the outcomes in usage prices and xed fees of various
interconnection arrangements (a2010; a2012; ac b; ab&k) for  2 [0; 0:8]. Unsurprisingly, the
o¤-net price increases with the level of the access charge and . This follows of course from
equation (7). Fig. 1 shows that Yoigo, having a very small market share, has little incentive
to raise o¤-net price for larger values of  since the amount of calls originated in that network
is small. Hence Yoigo harms the customers of rival networks very little by increasing the
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Figure 2: Equilibrium xed fees under di¤erent MTR regimes [a2010 (-), a2012 (- -), ac b (.-),
ab&k (.)].
o¤-net price. In other words, the strength of the call externality is not important for very
small rms (say, recent entrants) in terms of setting (o¤-net) retail price.
Since o¤-net price is increasing in the access charge, for a su¢ ciently low access charge it
may happen that o¤-net price lies below on-net price. In particular, this is the case when the
bill and keep regime is adopted. Here there is a critical level of  below which on-net price
(as dened in (6)) will be higher than o¤-net price (as dened in (7)), in which case it is
assumed that rms set a uniform price. In the simulations, four clear regions are identied:
(i)  < 0:29, (ii) 0:29   < 0:51, (iii) 0:51   < 0:68, and (iv)   0:68. In region (i),
all four rms must charge a uniform price; in region (ii) only Movistar price discriminates
between on- and o¤-net calls; in region (iii) Movistar and Vodafone price discriminate; in
region (iv) only Yoigo keeps charging a uniform price.
Regarding the xed fees the following points should be noted. There exists a waterbed
e¤ect on the xed component of the three-part tari¤. This result is perfectly consistent with
the theoretical result established in Hurkens and López (2010). The number of o¤-net calls
terminated on network i equals ni = i(1   i) which is increasing in i when i < 1=2.
Therefore, as the termination rate increases, the prot from terminating calls increases and
each rm will compete more ercely for market share. Yet, as will be clear below, the
waterbed e¤ect is not full. This means that rms keep part of termination rents instead
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of passing them on to their customers, and thus their prot is lower when the termination
rate decreases. As shown in Hurkens and López (2010), the partial waterbed e¤ect result is
due to the assumption of passive consumer expectations. Consumer expectations are passive
in the sense that they do not respond to out of equilibrium deviations by rms. Under
rationally responsive expectations, the waterbed e¤ect would be higher than one hundred
per cent. Consumers having rationally responsive expectations means that any change of a
price by one rm is assumed to lead to an instantaneous rational change in expectations of
all consumers, such that, given these changed expectations, optimal subscription decisions
will lead realized and expected network sizes to coincide. (For a detailed discussion of
consumer expectations and termination rates see Hurkens and López (2010).) Remarkably,
in an asymmetric oligopoly lowering MTR does not always lead to an increase in the xed
fee. As Fig. 2 illustrates, Movistars xed fee is lower with a2012 and ac b than with a2010
when the call externality is strong (i.e. for  > 0:7). To understand this result, observe
from equation (7) that a rms o¤-net price is increasing in its market share and in the call
externality parameter . Thus, the amount of o¤-net calls originated on the largest network
is quite low. Reducing the termination charge brings down the o¤-net price of the large
network, which boosts the amount of o¤-net calls originated in that network and thereby
raises signicantly the relative attractiveness of rival networks (since  is high). This leads
the large network to reduce its xed fee so as to maintain its market share.
Simulations show that Yoigos xed fee is negative with a2010 and a2012. The other rms
have a substantial advantage in demand because of incumbency (that is, their brand loyalty
parameter is high). Therefore, Yoigo has to compete more aggressively than its rivals to get
some market share. As commented above, the greater is the termination charge the more
intense is competition. As Yoigo has to undercut the price of its rivals so as to get some
market share, high termination charges lead Yoigo to o¤er subsidies. Nevertheless, Yoigo
makes positive prot because of termination revenues.
Market shares. Market shares are a¤ected by termination rates through their impact on
prices. Fig. 3 illustrates the e¤ect of termination charges on market shares for di¤erent values
of . First consider the cases: a2010; a2012; and ac b. The market shares of the two largest
operators (Movistar and Vodafone) increase as the access charge decreases. Conversely, the
market share of Orange is lower with a2012 (respectively ac b) than with a2010 for  < 0:4
(respectively, for  < 0:6). Similarly, Yoigos market share is reduced when access charge is
decreased. The appropriate conclusion seems to be that decreasing the access charge favours
(in terms of market shares) the larger operators. The reason is that reducing the termination
charge reduces the incentives for rms to compete for market share, which in turn makes
it easier for the two larger operators to increase their market share at the expense of the
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Figure 3: Equilibrium market shares under di¤erent MTR regimes [a2010 (-), a2012 (- -), ac b
(.-), ab&k (.)].
smaller operators. Turning now to the bill and keep regime, it is interesting to note that for
moderate values of the call externality parameter, Movistar increases signicantly its market
share at the expense of rivalscustomer bases.
Prot. Fig. 4 shows that rmsprot is typically increasing in the access charge. It
has already been noted that the waterbed e¤ect is not full. Therefore, as rms keep part
of the termination rents instead of passing them to their customers, they su¤er from cuts
in termination rates. The worst scenario from the viewpoint of rms is adopting the bill
and keep regime. In this case, Vodafone yields the lowest prot for  = 0:3 (i.e., when
Movistar starts to charge di¤erent prices for on- and o¤-net calls), whereas Orange reaches
its lowest prot for  = 0:5 (i.e., when Vodafone starts to charge di¤erent prices for on- and
o¤-net calls). Also note that for access charges at or above cost, the prot of the two larger
operators is increasing in  (as long as it is not too high). Conversely, for low/moderate
values of , Orange and Yoigos prot decrease with .
Aggregate surpluses and total welfare. The impact of termination rates on total consumer
surplus (TCS  M  CS), total prots (TP  P4i=1 i) and total welfare (TW = TCS +
TP ) is analyzed next. Hurkens and López (2010) show theoretically in the absence of call
externalities (i.e.,  = 0) that total welfare is maximized with termination charges at cost
(ac b), whereas consumer surplus is maximized with a below-cost termination charge. The
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Figure 4: Equilibrium prots under di¤erent MTR regimes [a2010 (-), a2012 (- -), ac b (.-),
ab&k (.)].
simulations show similar results hold in the case of an asymmetric oligopoly. In particular, for
 = 0, a reduction in termination charge from a2010 to ac b increases total consumer surplus
by 4:1%, reduces industry prot by 17:1%, and increases total welfare by 0:7%. Note that
the bill and keep regime yields in this case less consumer surplus than cost-based termination
rates. However, even for mild values of the call externality parameter bill and keep yields
higher consumer surplus than cost-based regulation. Table 2 details the change in aggregate
surpluses of various interconnection arrangements over a2010 for di¤erent positive values of
the call externality parameter  (results are reported in percentage). Clearly, the higher is
the call externality parameter, the higher is the gain in consumer or total welfare.
Table2. % Change in total consumer surplus, total prots and total welfare over a2010
% TCS 5% TP % TW
 0 :07 0:1 0:3 0:5 0 :07 0:1 0:3 0:5 0 :07 0:1 0:3 0:5
a2012 1:5 1:5 1:6 1:7 2:1 5:6 5:5 5:4 5:0 4:6 0:4 0:4 0:5 0:8 1:1
ac b 4:1 4:1 4:2 4:6 5:4 17:1 17:0 16:9 15:9 14:7 0:7 0:9 1:0 1:6 2:5
ab&k 3:9 4:9 5:4 8:2 10:1 17:3 21:7 23:4 32:8 34:9 0:5 0:8 1:0 2:3 3:7
Although the percentage gains in consumer surplus and total welfare are mild compared
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to the industry losses, in absolute terms the improvement in consumer surplus is substantial.
Table 3 reports in detail how consumers are a¤ected by di¤erent termination rate regimes
in the case where the call externality parameter is xed at the calibrated level  = 0:07.
Lower termination rates result in substantially lower average price per minute, noticeably
higher monthly xed fees and a larger amount of minutes consumed. The total monthly
bill stays approximately constant at e15. Total consumer surplus is increased by about
580 (690) million euros per year when termination rates are regulated at cost (set at zero,
respectively).
Table 3. Average price per minute (euro cents), average monthly xed fee (euros),
average number of minutes per month, average monthly bill (euros), consumer
surplus gain (with respect to a2010) per year (million euros)
 = 0:07
Av: Price
per minute
Av: Monthly
F ixed Fee
Av:Number
of minutes
Av: Monthly
bill
CS gain
wrt a2010
a2010 0:066 3:87 173:39 15:32
a2012 0:059 4:58 178:15 15:17 220
ac b 0:049 5:63 185:32 14:74 580
ab&k 0:033 8:35 195:71 14:93 690
4.2 Asymmetric termination rates
The focus of this paper has been to examine the implication of alternative scenarios of future
termination rates. The case of asymmetric termination rates is of particular interest since
the Spanish regulator has initially allowed the most recent entrant, Yoigo, to charge a much
higher termination rate than its established rivals. Similar asymmetries between established
rms and entrants have been observed in other countries, such as the UK. Regulators pre-
sumably applied asymmetric MTRs in order to help the entrants grow and thereby increase
competition in the market. The calibrated model in this paper can shed some light on the
consequences of applying asymmetric MTRs and test whether such asymmetries do favour
small rms and how this a¤ects consumers. For this reason, in this subsection the case where
all rmsMTRs are regulated at cost is compared with the one where (i) only the smallest
and most recent entrant Yoigo is allowed to charge a4 = 0:04 (denoted by a); and (ii) the
one where both Yoigo and Orange are allowed to charge an MTR equal to 0:04 (denoted by
a0).
Table 4 details the outcomes. Clearly Yoigo gains and the other rms lose from getting
the exclusive preferential treatment a. Yoigos prot increases by more than 100%, mainly
because its baseline prot is really low. Notice that consumers are also better o¤, whereas
16
total welfare is reduced. This result is in line with Peitz (2005). He considers an asymmetric
market and termination-based price discrimination, and shows that by granting an access
markup to the smaller operator, both its prot and consumer surplus increase, whereas total
surplus decreases. The simulations show that his result holds in asymmetric oligopolies with
passive expectations and positive call externality. However, since Yoigo is very small, the
aggregate e¤ects are really minor. When also Orange is allowed to charge 0:04 for terminating
calls, it benets a lot and Movistar and Vodafone are hurt. In particular, Orange increases
its market share at the expense of Movistar and Vodafones customer bases. The e¤ect
on Yoigos prot is also positive because of termination revenues. Nonetheless, consumer
surplus and total welfare decrease for all values of the call externality parameter.
Table 4. Asymmetric termination rates: Change in Orange and Yoigos prot,
consumer surplus and total welfare over cost-based access charges (ac b)
 1 2 3 4 3 4 CS TW
ac b 0:48 0:31 0:19 0:01
0 a 0:47 0:30 0:19 0:02  2:59 124:4% 0:05%  0:11%
a0 0:44 0:27 0:26 0:02 68:12% 84:67%  0:25%  0:43%
ac b 0:47 0:31 0:19 0:01
:07 a 0:47 0:30 0:19 0:02  2:79% 134:1% 0:05%  0:11%
a0 0:44 0:27 0:26 0:02 69:79% 89:99%  0:24%  0:47%
ac b 0:47 0:31 0:19 0:01
0:1 a 0:47 0:30 0:19 0:02  2:89% 138% 0:05%  0:12%
a0 0:44 0:27 0:26 0:02 70:27% 92%  0:24%  0:48%
ac b 0:47 0:31 0:19 0:01
0:3 a 0:47 0:30 0:19 0:02  3:61% 159% 0:07%  0:13%
a0 0:44 0:27 0:25 0:02 69:75% 101%  0:21%  0:56%
ac b 0:46 0:31 0:20 0:01
0:5 a 0:46 0:31 0:19 0:02  4:55% 168% 0:11%  0:14%
a0 0:44 0:27 0:25 0:02 63:32% 101%  0:17%  0:62%
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the e¤ects of MTR regulation can be predicted by rst calibrating
the model of Hurkens and López (2010) (extended to account for more than two rms,
asymmetries and call externalities) and then calculating the equilibrium outcome under
di¤erent MTR regimes. Employing a rich data set about the Spanish market it was found
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that lowering termination rates towards cost is always (that is, for all values of the call
externality) good for consumer surplus and total welfare but hurts all rms. Even though
the calibrated call externality parameter is as low as 0:07, Spanish consumers gain about
580 million euros on a yearly basis from the reduction in MTR from e0.05 to cost. The
reported gains in consumer surplus are most likely underestimated, as only post-pay clients
are included in the analysis. Since pre-pay clients do not pay xed fees, one would expect
that these clients will hardly notice any waterbed e¤ect so that a reduction in MTR will be
passed on to consumers by means of lower retail prices.
The simulation results are consistent with the ndings of Growitsch et al. (2010) in their
case study of the Spanish market between 2006 and 2009. In that period the MTR was re-
duced from e0.11 to e0.057. In the same period average retail price was reduced, the number
of minutes was increased, and also the monthly xed fee increased. A further indicator of
the reliability of the simulation results and the underlying model is that prots are predicted
to decline steeply. This is consistent with the opposition that mobile network operators have
exhibited over the last decade, not only in Spain but also in other European countries. In
this respect the results are in stark contrast with the ones obtained by Harbord and Hoernig
(2010) in their calibration of the UK market. They predict rmsprots to strongly increase
as MTRs are reduced. The reason for this stark contrast must lie in the assumption about
consumer expectations, since otherwise the underlying models13, calibration methods and
assumptions are very similar.
References
[1] ARCEP (2008). Les référentiels de coûts de opérateurs mobiles en 2008. Paris. Retrieved
from http:==www.arcep.fr=uploads=tx_gspublication=consult-tamobile2008-040908.pdf
[2] Armstrong, M. & Wright, J. (2009). Mobile call termination. Economic Journal, 119,
F270-F307.
[3] Berger, U. (2004). Access charges in the presence of call externalities. Contributions to
Economic Analysis & Policy, 3 (1), Article 21.
[4] Berger, U. (2005). Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing. Economics Letters, 86,
107-112.
13Harbord and Hoernig (2010) use the spokes model, an extension of the Hotelling model to markets with
any number of rms, rather than the Logit model that is employed in the present paper. However, these
models do not give qualitatively di¤erent results.
18
[5] Cambini, C., & Valletti, T. (2008). Information exchange and competition in commu-
nications networks. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 56, 707-728.
[6] Carter, M., & Wright, J. (1999). Interconnection in network industries. Review of In-
dustrial Organization, 14, 1-25.
[7] Carter, M., & Wright, J. (2003). Asymmetric network interconnection. Review of In-
dustrial Organization, 22, 27-46.
[8] CMT. (2009). Resolution approving the establishment of a glide-path to set prices
for voice termination connection services on mobile networks belonging to opera-
tors determined to have signicant market power. (July 29, 2009). Retrieved from
http:==www.cmt.es=es=resoluciones=28-2009=4802228 - 4913840=RE-2009-7-29-2-2.pdf
[9] CMT. (2010). Estadísticas del sector: IV trimestre - 2010. Retrieved from
http:==www.cmt.es=es=publicaciones=anexos=20110401_IVT_2010_.pdf
[10] Competition Commission. (2003). Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile: Reports
on references under section 13 of Telecommunications Act 1984 on charges made
by Vodafone, Orange, O2 and T-Mobile for terminating calls made by xed
and mobile networks, HMSO, London. Retrieved from http:==www.competition-
commission.org.uk=rep_pub=reports=2003=475mobilephones.htm
[11] De Bijl, P.W.J., & Peitz, M. (2000). Competition and regulation in telecommunications
markets. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. The Hague, Nether-
lands.
[12] De Bijl, P.W.J., & Peitz, M. (2004). Dynamic regulation and entry in telecommunica-
tions markets: A policy framework. Information Economics and Policy, 16, 411-437.
[13] Dewenter, R., & Haucap, J. (2008). Demand elasticities for mobile telecommunications
in Austria. Journal of Economics and Statistics, 228, 49-63.
[14] EC. 2009. Commission recommendation on the regulatory treatment of xed
and mobile termination rates in the EU. (2009/396/EC). O¢ cial Journal of the
European Union (May 20, 2009), L124/67-L124/74. Retrieved from http:==eur-
lex.europa.eu=LexUriServ=LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:124:0067:0074:EN:PDF
[15] Gans, J.S., & King, S.P. (2001). Using bill and keep interconnect arrangements to
soften network competition. Economics Letters, 71, 413-420.
19
[16] Genakos, C., & Valletti, T. (2011). Testing the waterbede¤ect in mobile telecommu-
nications. Journal of the European Economic Association. Forthcoming.
[17] Growitsch, C., Marcus, J.S., & Wernick, C. (2010). The e¤ects of lower termination
rates (MTRs) on retail price and demand. Communications & Strategies, 80 (4thQ),
119-140.
[18] Harbord, D., & Hoernig, S. (2010). Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termi-
nation rates in the UK (with an application to the Orange/T-Mobile merger).
CEPR Discussion Paper 7730. Retrieved from http:==www.cepr.org=pubs=new-
dps=dplist.asp?dpno=7730.asp
[19] Harbord, D., & Pagnozzi, M. (2010). Network-based price discrimination and bill and
keepvs. cost-basedregulation of mobile termination rates. Review of Network Eco-
nomics 9 (1), Article 1.
[20] Hoernig, S., Inderst, R., & Valletti, T. (2011). Calling circles: network competition with
non-uniform calling patterns. CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper Series, No. 206.
[21] Hurkens, S., & López, A.L. (2010). Mobile termination, network externali-
ties, and consumer expectations. IESE Working Paper D/850-E. Retrieved from
http:==www.iese.edu=research=pdfs=DI-0850-E.pdf
[22] Jeon, D.S., La¤ont, J.J., & Tirole, J. (2004). On the receiver-pays principle. Rand
Journal of Economics, 35, 85-110.
[23] Jullien, B., Rey, P., & Sand-Zantman, W. (2010). Mobile call ter-
mination revisited. IDEI Working Paper, no 551. Retrieved from
http:==www.idei.fr=doc=wp=2010=wp_idei_551.pdf
[24] Katz, M.L., & Shapiro, C.S. (1985). Network externalities, competition, and compati-
bility. American Economic Review, 75, 424-440.
[25] La¤ont, J.J., Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (1998a). Network competition I: Overview and nondis-
criminatory pricing. Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 1-37.
[26] La¤ont, J.J., Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (1998b). Network competition II: Price discrimination.
Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 38-56.
[27] López, A.L. (2011). Mobile termination rates and the receiver-pays regime. Information
Economics and Policy, 23, 171-181.
20
[28] Ofcom. (2007). Mobile call termination statement, 27 March, London. Retrieved from
http:==stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk=binaries=consultations=mobile_call_term=statement=statement.pdf
[29] Peitz, M. (2005). Asymmetric regulation of access and price discrimination in telecom-
munications. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 28, 327-343.
[30] Small, K.A., & Rosen, H.S. (1981). Applied welfare economics with discrete choice
models. Econometrica, 49, 105-130.
Appendix
Table A.1. Robustness (termination cost): Average prices, average consumption, and consumer
surplus gain with respect to a2010
cT  = 0:07
Av: Price
per minute
Av: Monthly
F ixed Fee
Av:Number
of minutes
Av: Monthly
bill
CS gain
wrt a2010
a2010 0:046 3:87 186:23 12:47
0:01 a2012 0:039 4:61 191:04 12:20 240
ac b 0:020 6:70 204:83 10:81 1010
ab&k 0:013 7:88 209:07 10:75 1065
a2010 0:066 3:87 173:39 15:32
0:0245 a2012 0:059 4:58 178:15 15:17 220
ac b 0:049 5:63 185:32 14:74 580
ab&k 0:033 8:35 195:71 14:93 690
a2010 0:073 3:87 168:52 16:25
0:03 a2012 0:066 4:57 173:25 16:16 213
ac b 0:060 5:26 177:92 15:96 434
ab&k 0:041 8:50 190:66 16:35 558
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Table A.2. Robustness (elasticity): Average prices, average consumption, and consumer
surplus gain with respect to a2010
"  = 0:07
Av: Price
per minute
Av: Monthly
F ixed Fee
Av:Number
of minutes
Av: Monthly
bill
CS gain
wrt a2010
a2010 0:066 3:87 162:25 14:63
 0:3 a2012 0:059 4:57 165:10 14:40 196
ac b 0:049 5:56 169:40 13:88 520
ab&k 0:033 7:99 175:65 13:90 625
a2010 0:066 3:87 173:39 15:32
 0:5 a2012 0:059 4:58 178:15 15:17 220
ac b 0:049 5:63 185:32 14:74 580
ab&k 0:033 8:35 195:71 14:93 690
a2010 0:065 3:87 184:54 16:00
 0:7 a2012 0:059 4:60 191:19 15:94 244
ac b 0:049 5:71 201:24 15:59 639
ab&k 0:033 8:70 215:76 15:96 756
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